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THE PORTUGUESE DISINFLATION EXPERIENCE IN THE PERIOD 1984-1998*
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1. INTRODUCTION
In the early 1980s the Portuguese economy was
characterised by severe macroeconomic dise-
quilibria, an uncompetitive industry structure, sig-
nificant distortions in product and factor markets
and a substantial weight of the public sector in
productive activities, inherited from the 1974 Rev-
olution. Monetary policy was based on capital
controls, credit ceilings and administratively fixed
interest rates. Financial markets were thin and the
availability of financial instruments was rather
limited. Financial institutions (essentially banks)
were mostly state-owned, undercapitalised and in-
efficient. In practice the banking system was
geared to financing huge public sector borrowing
requirements. The Treasury benefited from impor-
tant sources of privileged financing, including ex-
tensive recourse to central bank financing. Ex-
change rate policy followed a crawling-peg to pre-
serve the competitiveness of Portuguese exporters
with a view to containing high and persistent cur-
rent account deficits(1). The country was caught in
a vicious circle of devaluation and inflation.
In 1985, the year preceding EC accession, Por-
tuguese real per capita income stood slightly above
50 per cent of the European Union (EU) average,
reflecting the country’s low productivity levels.
The implementation of the 1983 IMF stabilisation
package had brought the current account back into
balance and had put inflation and the general gov-
ernment deficit on a declining path. However, in-
flation still ran at 20 per cent (14 percentage points
(p.p.) above the EU average) and the general gov-
ernment net borrowing exceeded 10 per cent of
GDP, more than twice the EU average (Table 1).
The poor economic performance of the 1970s
and early 1980s had made it clear that macroeco-
nomic stability and deep structural reform were
necessary conditions for a sustainable convergence
of the Portuguese real per capita income to the Eu-
ropean level, and that a regime shift was war-
ranted. Accession to the European Community
(EC) underlined the authorities’ commitment to
such a regime shift and provided the right incen-
tives for the necessary changes.
The general economic situation has strongly
improved since EC accession. Nominal stabilisa-
tion and a rapid catching-up have taken place, re-
flecting the increased competition from integration
in the Community market, the implementation of
broadly appropriate macroeconomic and struc-
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(1) In less than a decade, the country suffered two balance of pay-
ments crises which led to the negotiation of stabilisation agree-
ments with the IMF in 1978 and 1983. The crawling peg was
introduced in August 1977 (i.e. a few months before the negoti-
ation of the first IMF stabilisation package), in the context of se-
vere balance of payments difficulties. It consisted of a
pre-announced monthly depreciation rate of the escudo vis-à-
vis a basket of 13 currencies. Between 1978 and 1983, four dis-
crete devaluations (May 1978, June 1982, March 1983, June
1983) and one discrete revaluation (February 1980) have also
taken place.tural policies and EC financial support. GDP per
head, expressed in purchasing power parities, in-
creased to about 75 per cent of the EU average in
1998 (Chart 1). Inflation was brought down to
levels broadly compatible with price stability and
the differential against the EU virtually disap-
peared. The general government net borrowing
was reduced to below the 3 per cent of GDP
Maastricht reference value, and the public debt ra-
tio was brought down to below the EU average.
Significant progress towards nominal convergence
allowed Portugal to meet the conditions for parti-
cipation in Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)
as from January 1999, and thus to be one of the
eleven founding members of the euro area.
This paper discusses one of the pillars of the
Portuguese convergence process, i.e., the disinfla-
tion experience. Section 2 presents a brief over-
view of the disinflation process. Given that ex-
change rate stability was at the heart of the disin-
flation strategy, section 3 describes the monetary
and exchange rate policy in Portugal from Com-
munity accession to EMU membership. Section 4
discusses disinflation costs. It will be argued that
these appear to have been rather low, or non-
existent. Section 5 concludes.
2. OVERVIEW OF THE DISINFLATION
PROCESS
At the time of accession to the European Com-
munity, Portugal recorded the second highest in-
flation rate amongst EC Member-States (only sur-
passed by Greece), and the differential against the
EC average stood at about 14 p.p. Inflation, which
had peaked at almost 30 per cent in 1984, declined
to about 2 per cent in 1997-98, a level generally
considered as broadly compatible with price sta-
bility. At the same time, the differential against the
Community average was virtually eliminated. Dis-
inflation was not an even process, however. After
a very rapid decline between 1984 and 1987, infla-
tion resumed an upward trend in 1988-90. A
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Table 1
PORTUGAL AND EU15 – SELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS
1985 1991 1998
Portugal EU15 Portugal EU15 Portugal EU15
GDP per head (PPS; EU15=100)................. 5 3 1 0 0 64.4(a) 100 74.8 100
Real GDP (% change).......................... 2 . 8 2 . 6 2 . 3 1 . 7 3 . 5 2 . 7
Inflation (private consumption deflator) ......... 19.4 5.9 12.2 5.8 1.8 1.7
Unemployment (%) ........................... 8 . 7 1 0 4 8 . 1 5 . 2 9 . 9
Current Account (% of GDP) ................... 0 . 5 0 . 5 -0.9 -1.2 -4.7(b) 0.9
General Government net borrowing (% of GDP)
(c). 10.3 4.5 5.9 4.2 2.1 1.5
General Government debt (% of GDP)
(d).......... 6 8 53.6 65.9 55.2 56.5 69
Source: European Commission and Banco de Portugal.
Notes:
(a) Series break in 1991 due to the inclusion of Eastern Germany.
(b)   Series  break  in  1996.  Figure  for  1998  includes  capital  transfers  for  comparability  with  previous  years.
(c) Data for 1985 and 1991 according to ESA79. Data for 1998 according to ESA95.
(d) Maastricht definition. GDP for 1998 according to ESA95.
Chart 1







































































































Source: European Commission.steady deceleration of prices has then taken place
up to 1997/98 (Chart 2).
As from the mid-1980s disinflation has become
a major goal of economic policy.(2) To ensure a per-
manent decline of inflation, exchange rate policy
became progressively less accommodating,(3) so as
to break the vicious circle of inflation-devaluation
without putting the sustainability of external ac-
counts into question. In addition, economic agents
were encouraged to set nominal wages on the ba-
sis of expected (rather than past) price increases.
Inflation, measured by the average rate of change
of the consumer price index (CPI), declined from
29.3 per cent in 1984 to 9.3 per cent in 1987. In this
period, inflation in both the tradable and the non-
tradable goods sectors moved closely together.
The slack which emerged following the implemen-
tation of the 1983 IMF stabilisation package, cou-
pled with favourable international price develop-
ments in the mid-1980s, allowed a substantial de-
celeration of prices to take place in the context of
strong GDP growth (Chart 3A).
In 1988, as the economy moved into a state of
overheating and international price developments
turned less favourable, inflation resumed an up-
ward trend, with average CPI inflation increasing
to 13.4 per cent in 1990. The setback in the disinfla-
tion process reflected the acceleration of import
prices, an unfavourable agricultural year in 1988
and tight labour market conditions. Accordingly,
an acceleration of both tradable and non-tradable
goods prices has taken place (Chart 3B). After fall-
ing by 9.1 per cent in 1986, the goods and services
import deflator increased by an average of 7.0 per
cent a year between 1987 and 1989 (Chart 3C). In
turn, as the unemployment rate reached levels
clearly below estimates of the Portuguese
NAIRU,(4) unit labour costs accelerated from 7.6 in
1988 to 18.6 in 1991 (Chart 3D). In this period, the
pre-announced rate of depreciation of the escudo
continued to be cut down in spite of the accelera-
tion of prices, and the escudo started appreciating
in real terms. Reflecting the non-accommodating
exchange rate policy, tradables prices resumed a
decelerating trend in 1990, whereas non-tradables
inflation kept edging up in a context of significant
wage pressure and an increasingly unbalanced
policy-mix. As a result, the differential between
non-tradables and tradables inflation widened sig-
nificantly, peaking at 10.1 p.p. in 1990.
A monetary policy strategy based on exchange
rate stability as an intermediate target to reach the
final goal of price stability was progressively
adopted. In October 1990 the crawling-peg regime
was abandoned, and eighteen months later the es-
cudo joined the exchange rate mechanism (ERM)
of the European Monetary System (EMS) (Chart
4). After being devalued in the context of the ERM
crisis of 1992-93, the nominal exchange rate was
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Chart 2























































































(2) See the 10
th Constitutional Government’s Programme, dated
November 1985 (Diário da Assembleia da República, II série no.4,
16/11/1985).
(3) In addition to being an effective tool to promote decline of in-
flation, the exchange-rate based disinflation strategy also fos-
tered an adequate environment for sustainable economic
development. Indeed, while the real depreciation of the cur-
rency maintained competitiveness through a deterioration of
real wages (favouring a specialisation in low value added ac-
tivities), a non-accommodating exchange rate policy provided
the right incentives to exporters (by making them aware that
competitiveness would have to rely on qualitative factors such
as innovation, product differentiation, improved management
techniques).
(4) See Botas, Marques and Neves (1998). Estimates of the Portu-
guese NAIRU point to values in the range 5.5 to 6.0 per cent.
These values should not be extrapolated to the current date. In
1998, the Employment Survey of the Instituto Nacional de
Estatística underwent important methodological changes, in the
context of the adoption of Eurostat guidelines towards greater
statistical harmonisation. These changes resulted into a statisti-
cal break in 1997-98, with an estimated magnitude of 0.75 to 1
percentage points. Taking the statistical break into account,
NAIRU estimates should be updated to the range of 4.5-5.0 per
cent.kept broadly stable since mid-1993 to 1998. Consis-
tent with their announced strategy, the authorities
did not to make use of the enlarged room for ma-
noeuvre provided by the enlarged ERM bands,
and official interest rates were adjusted in a man-
ner consistent with the maintenance of exchange
rate stability.
Inflation followed a continuous downward
trend in the period 1991-97, with CPI inflation
reaching 2.2 per cent 1997. The emergence of a
negative output gap in 1993 and the subsequent
increase of unemployment fostered wage modera-
tion, contributing to a steady deceleration of non-
tradable goods prices. Nominal unit labour costs
decelerated to 2.2 per cent in 1994, and remained
relatively moderate up to 1998. The monetary and
exchange rate policy pursued since the early-1990s
was key in containing inflation expectations
throughout the decade, particularly when the
economy re-bounded as from the mid-1990s. Por-
tugal was in a position to comply with the price
stability criterion for EMU participation since July
1997.
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Chart 3
THE PORTUGUESE DISINFLATION PROCESS – 1984-1998






















































































Sources: INE and European Commission.






























































Sources: INE and Banco de Portugal.
































































Sources: European Commission and Banco de Portugal.






























































Sources: European Commission and Banco de Portugal.3. MONETARY AND EXCHANGE RATE POLICY
IN 1986-1998
This section describes the monetary and ex-
change rate policy developments in Portugal from
EC accession to EMU participation.(5) The section
is divided into two parts. The first sub-section cov-
ers the period from EC accession in 1986 to early
1992, when the escudo joined the ERM. In this pe-
riod economic policy was driven by the need to
implement the Single Market programme and the
acquis communautaire. The second sub-section cov-
ers the period 1992-1998, i.e., the period from the
agreement on the Maastricht Treaty to the start of
monetary union. In this period ensuring compli-
ance with the convergence criteria for EMU partic-
ipation was the immediate priority of economic
policy. This corresponds also to the period of ERM
membership.
3.1. From EC Accession to the Maastricht Treaty
(1986-1991)
In the mid-1980s disinflation became the main
goal of monetary and exchange rate policy, and
the exchange rate was chosen as the main instru-
ment of the disinflation strategy. The monthly rate
of depreciation of the escudo was successively cut
down in the period from 1986 to 1990, even when
inflation temporarily rebounded in 1988-90. In
contrast to the previous decade, the inflation dif-
ferential between Portugal and its main trading
partners was no longer fully compensated, and the
escudo appreciated in real terms as from 1987
(Chart 5).
After a very substantial decline in 1984-87, in-
flation resumed an upward trend in 1988-90.(6) The
rebound in the inflation rate and the concomitant
increase in the inflation differential against the
Community average, at a time when exchange rate
policy had turned less accommodating have taken
the authorities by surprise. Indeed, in the previous
decade the behaviour of inflation in Portugal
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Source: Banco de Portugal.
(5) Although the focus here is on monetary and exchange rate pol-
icy, and most notably its role in the disinflation strategy, it is
important to emphasise that changes to the monetary and ex-
change rate policy framework were part of a coherent package
which also included financial sector reform and the consolida-
tion of public finances. It is also worth noting that the timing
and the sequencing of the various reforms is relevant. In partic-
ular, and as far as the Portuguese experience is concerned,
steady fiscal adjustment was a pre-requisite for financial re-
form and the gradual elimination of central bank financing of
the public sector. Indeed, without a substantial reduction of the
public sector borrowing requirement, the move to financing at
market-determined rates would have translated into an explo-
sive budget deficit. See OCDE (1999) and Borges (1991b).
Chart 5
PORTUGAL – REAL EFFECTIVE
EXCHANGE RATE






























































Sources: OECD; INE and Banco de Portugal.
(6) Over this period, year-on-year inflation increased from (a mini-
mum of) 8.0 per cent in April 1988, to (a maximum of) 14.4 per
cent in October 1990.seemed to be well explained by the (relative ver-
sion of the) Purchasing Power Parity theory.(7)
As noted in section 2 above, an acceleration of
both tradables and non-tradables prices has ini-
tially taken place. However, while tradables infla-
tion resumed a declining trend as from mid-1989,
non-tradables prices kept on accelerating until late
1990.(8) As a result, a substantial inflation differen-
tial between both sectors emerged, leading to a
marked increase of the relative price of non-
tradables. To the extent that this increasing differ-
ential reflected strong productivity gains in the
tradable goods sector there was no cause for con-
cern (see Section 4 below). However, signs of an
increasingly overheated economy were also be-
coming apparent. The closing of the output gap
and the deterioration of the trade balance in the
late 1980s, as well as the decline in unemployment
and the acceleration of unit labour costs, signalled
that domestic production was limited by capacity
constraints and a tight labour market. The re-
bound in the inflation rate, and in particular the
strong acceleration of prices in the sheltered sec-
tor, added to the signs of overheating.
An increasingly unbalanced policy-mix exacer-
bated excess demand in the economy in the early
1990s. While a significant decline in the general
government deficit and an improvement of the cy-
clically-adjusted primary balance have taken place
up to 1989, the early 1990s witnessed a reversal in
fiscal consolidation (Chart 6). The latter was ini-
tially caused by a sharp increase in the ratio of pri-
mary public expenditure in a context of favourable
cyclical conditions, which translated into a signifi-
cant deterioration of both the actual and cycli-
cally-adjusted primary balances.(9)
In the monetary front, as capital movement lib-
eralization was being progressively implemented,
the authorities tried to control aggregate demand
through a tight monetary policy without allowing
for an excessive real appreciation of the escudo.
This resulted in a vicious circle, which came to be
known as the monetary policy dilemma: high domes-
tic interest rates coupled with a tightly managed
(and thus highly predictable) exchange rate in the
context of the crawling-peg regime fostered strong
(in particular short-term) capital inflows, raising
serious difficulties to the management of domestic
liquidity.(10)
The interruption of the disinflation process and
the difficulties in controlling domestic liquidity
prompted profound changes in the monetary and
exchange rate policy framework. Credit ceilings,
which had become ineffective, were abolished in
March 1990, a new system of reserve requirements
was put in place in May 1990, and a major liquid-
ity absorption operation was carried out in De-
cember 1990 and March 1991 to mop up the excess
22 Banco de Portugal /Economic bulletin /December 2001
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Chart 6
GG NET BORROWING AND PRIMARY
CURRENT EXPENDITURE













































































(7) According to Barosa and Cunha (1989), Portuguese inflation
behaved in accordance with the (rate form of the) PPP relation-
ship in the period 1976-1987. In a later study, the same authors
show that the PPP relationship has been broken in late 1987
(see Barosa and Cunha (1990)).
(8) Tradable goods prices accelerated from below 7 per cent in
May 1988 to over 13 per cent in January 1989, whereas
non-tradable goods inflation increased from around 8 per cent
in early 1998 to over 20 per cent in late 1990.
(9) The ratio of primary current expenditure to GDP increased
from 26.5 per cent in 1989 to 30.6 per cent in 1991. Over the
same period, the cumulative deterioration of the ciclically-
adjusted primary balance amounted to almost 3 percentage
points of GDP. For a detailed account of fiscal policy in the pe-
riod 1986-1994, see Cunha and Neves (1995).
(10)It is a well-documented result in economics that one cannot
have at the same time free capital movements, an exchange
rate target and an autonomous monetary policy. Indeed, in a
context of financial integration, markets ensure the equaliza-
tion of expected returns from assets denominated in different
currencies. Accordingly, the domestic interest rate reflects the
foreign interest rate and the expected depreciation of the cur-
rency.liquidity created under the system of credit ceil-
ings. In addition, a new central bank law was in-
troduced in October 1990(11), imposing limits to the
monetary financing of budget deficits.(12) Interest
rates had already been progressively liberalized in
the second half of the 1980s.(13) A system of indi-
rect, market-based monetary management was
thus implemented.(14)
The crawling-peg regime was abandoned in
October 1990. At the time, the monthly rate of de-
preciation against a basket of thirteen currencies
stood at 0.25 per cent. The aim of the exchange
rate regime shift was two-fold. First, the authori-
ties wished to introduce some short-term unpre-
dictability in the exchange rate of the escudo in or-
der to discourage (short-term) capital inflows. Sec-
ondly, the new regime should prepare the country
for future participation in the ERM. Against this
background, the objective of a 3.0 per cent depreci-
ation was initially kept, but over an undefined ho-
rizon (i.e., in the short term the escudo would be
allowed to fluctuate within a non-announced
band). In addition, the reference basket against
which the escudo was measured was changed to a
basket of five ERM currencies.(15) In parallel, the
authorities tried to insulate the domestic market
through a temporary re-imposition of controls on
the inflow of capital. A compulsory non-remu-
nerated deposit amounting to 40.0 per cent of for-
eign borrowing was introduced in July 1990 and,
one year later, restrictions were re-imposed on the
purchase of floating-rate Portuguese securities by
non-residents.
The depreciation objective was gradually re-
placed by a policy of “stability of the escudo”. In
the 18-month period from October 1990 – when
the crawling peg was abandoned – and March
1992 – just before ERM entry –, the escudo appre-
ciated by 2.6 percent in nominal effective terms
(Chart 7), and by a similar magnitude against the
D-mark. Given the still substantial inflation differ-
ential against the EU average, the (CPI-based) real
effective exchange rate appreciated by about 15
per cent between 1990 and 1992.
Changes to the monetary and exchange rate
policy framework failed to put an end to the mon-
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(11)See “Lei Orgânica do Banco de Portugal” (Decree-Law no. 337/90
of 30 October, Diário da República, Is é rie, nº251, 30.10.1990).
(12)In practice, monetary financing had been considerably reduced
since the mid-1980s, reflecting the rapid decline of the general
government borrowing requirement, as well as an increasing
willingness on the part of the Treasury to obtain financing in
the capital market. Formally, the 1990 Central Bank Law still
provided for two important exceptions to the prohibition of
monetary financing: an overdraft facility (worth 10 per cent of
government revenue) and the underwritting of Treasury Bills
by the Banco de Portugal (subject to conditions negotiated be-
tween the Bank and the Treasury). No use was made of the
possibility of underwritting Treasury Bills since 1991. The in-
terest-free overdraft facility was abolished in December 1992,
with the amount outstanding being converted into a
non-marketable 10-year loan bearing a 1.3 per cent interest rate
that would gradually converge to market rates. Since January
1994 (when the Second Stage of EMU started), the prohibition
of monetary financing applies to all EU countries.
(13)A maximum rate on demand deposits and a minimum rate on
six-month deposits remained in place from March 1989 to May
1992.
(14)The monetary policy framework which in the early 1990s
emerged from the introduction of market-based monetary
management was broadly similar to the one prevailing in most
other EU countries, and to the monetary policy framework
which would later on be adopted by the ECB. Banks were sub-
ject to reserve requirements and liquidity was provided
through open market operations. The interest rate applying to
these operations signalled the stance of monetary policy and
steered the very short term money market rates. Standing facil-
ities for the provision and absorption of liquidity were avail-
able in 1993-94. The interest rates applying to these facilities set
a corridor within which money market rates fluctuated.
Chart 7
NOMINAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE
OF THE ESCUDO
































































































Source: Banco de Portugal.
Note: Volatility measured as monthly standard devia-
tion of daily changes.
(15)These currencies were the D-mark, Sterling, the French franc,
the Italian lira and the Spanish peseta.etary policy dilemma because the authorities tried
to keep nominal interest rates at a high level in or-
der to fight inflation (Chart 8) but, at the same
time, continued to resist the pressure towards
nominal appreciation of the escudo out of fear of
harming competitiveness. As domestic interest
rates were raised to curb excessive demand
growth, the positive interest rate differential at-
tracted substantial (in particular short term) capi-
tal inflows from abroad, putting upward pressure
on the exchange rate of the escudo. This was a pe-
riod of strong optimism in international financial
markets. Risk were low and the escudo, like the
higher-yielding ERM currencies, was the object of
“convergence plays” (see section 3.2 below). The
Banco de Portugal intervened in the foreign ex-
change market by selling escudos in order to pre-
vent an excessive appreciation of the exchange
rate which could harm competitiveness. Foreign
exchange market intervention increased domestic
liquidity and put downward pressure on domestic
interest rates. The Banco de Portugal then tried to
dry up the excess liquidity through open-market
operations in order to keep interest rates high,
again stimulating capital inflows. Since the cur-
rency was seen as a “one way bet”, administrative
restrictions proved rather ineffective to contain
capital inflows and net foreign assets peaked at
over 25 per cent of GDP in 1991 (Chart 9). Never-
theless, the difficulties in controlling liquidity did
not prevent the beginning of a sustained process
of disinflation. During this period of “limited
floating”, the year-on-year CPI inflation declined
from over 14 per cent to below 9 per cent
3.2. The ERM experience (1992-1998)
In April 1992, the escudo joined the exchange
rate mechanism of the European Monetary System
with a fluctuation band of +6.0 per cent.(16) For a
small open economy, exchange rate stability
vis-à-vis a set of currencies with a high degree of
nominal stability is a powerful means to reach
price stability in the medium-run. ERM member-
ship underlined the authorities’ commitment to
the pursuit of a non-accommodating exchange rate
policy, and was therefore expected to have a fa-
vourable impact on inflation expectations. Mem-
bership was also a necessary step to ensure that
the country would be a candidate for participation
in Economic and Monetary Union.
After joining the ERM, the escudo became the
strongest currency in the parity grid, and reached
the ceiling against the weakest currency in the sys-
tem, which at the time was the British Pound.
These were still the times of the “hard EMS” and
of “convergence palys”.(17) Strong performance in
the band placed downward pressure on domestic
interest rates, at a time when year-on-year infla-
tion was edging up again, due to an increase in in-
24 Banco de Portugal /Economic bulletin /December 2001
Articles
Chart 8







































































Sources: European Economy and INE.
Chart 9




























































Source: Banco de Portugal.
(16)The ECU central rate was set at about 1.4 per cent below the
market rate prevailing at the time.direct taxes.(18) In August 1992, the Government
announced that all remaining capital controls
would be gradually abolished until the end of the
year. This announcement was accompanied by a
significant decline in official interest rates in order
to prevent disturbing capital inflows from increas-
ing further. The repo rate declined by 2 p.p. (from
18 to 16 per cent) in the three and half month pe-
riod between ERM entry and mid-August (when
full capital account liberalisation was announced).
The decision to fully liberalise capital movements
virtually eliminated the room for manoeuvre of
domestic monetary policy, as official interest rates
had to be used to ensure that the exchange rate
was kept within the ERM fluctuation bands.
In spite of a promising start, the first year of
ERM participation was not an easy one. The es-
cudo started to fall to the lower half of its fluctua-
tion band, reflecting a combination of external and
domestic factors. First and foremost, the loss of
credibility of the ERM in the wake of the Danish
referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in June 1992
translated into a significant increase of the risk
premia of the currencies from countries with the
worst stability track-records. “Convergence plays”
ended abruptly causing a massive shift out of
those currencies. Secondly, the temporary increase
in inflation, coupled with the marked decline of
interest rates following the announcement of full
capital movement liberalisation, created an in-
creasing perception of incompatible policy re-
quirements in the domestic and the external front.
The escudo was thus caught in the turmoil
which affected the ERM in 1992-93, and which led
to the widening of the ERM fluctuation bands to
15.0 per cent in August 1993.(19) During this pe-
riod, the escudo was devalued twice (Chart 10A).
After resisting a speculative attack in September
1992 – when the central rate of the Spanish peseta
was devalued by 5.0 per cent and the Italian lira
and British pound suspended their intervention
obligations within the ERM –, the central rate of
the Portuguese escudo was devalued by 6.0 per
cent in November 1992, and by 6.5 per cent in May
1993. These adjustments have taken place in the
context of realignment requests by the Spanish au-
thorities, i.e. the realignments were not initiated
by the Portuguese authorities, and in fact the es-
cudo was not under particularly strong pressure
in either occasion. However, the devaluation of
the peseta (by 6.0 and 8.0 per cent, respectively)
changed the conditions which had determined the
choice of the central parity of the escudo. In partic-
ular, the loss of competitiveness vis-à-vis Spain
(one of Portugal’s main trading partners a a major
competitor in third markets) that would occur if
the escudo were not devalued along with the pe-
seta could have been very hard to sustain, particu-
larly at a time when the credibility of the ERM was
severely damaged and domestic fundamentals
were deteriorating fast. Indeed, the period of rapid
economic expansion was coming to an end, and a
significant slowdown of real GDP growth led to a
recession in 1993.
In spite of deteriorating domestic conditions,
the Portuguese authorities did not exploit the in-
creased room for manoeuvre provided by the en-
larged ERM fluctuation margins, so that official in-
terest rates were adjusted in a manner consistent
with the maintenance of exchange rate stability
(Charts 10A to 10D). In the aftermath of the Mex-
ico crisis (December 1994) tensions re-emerged in
the ERM. On 6 March 1995 the central rate of the
peseta was devalued by 7.0 per cent. On the same
occasion, the central parity of the escudo was ad-
justed by 3.5 per cent, so as to bring it in line with
market rates prevailing since August 1993. This
was the third and last realignment of the central
rate of the escudo during its ERM membership.
This adjustment did not compromise the goal of
exchange rate stability.
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the deprecia-
tion of the nominal exchange rate in late 1992 and
early 1993 did not prevent the gradual and contin-
uous decline of the inflation rate. The fact that the
devaluations of the escudo were probably not per-
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(17)The absence of realignments in the EMS since 1987 and increas-
ing prospects regarding the creation of a monetary union in
Europe fostered large capital inflows into the higher-yielding
ERM currencies. Investors believed that all ERM countries
were on a sustainable convergence path towards monetary un-
ion, so that interest rate differentials in favour of the higher
yielding currencies significantly overestimated the actual risk
of exchange rate depreciation. This phenomenon came to be
known as “the convergence play”. See IMF(1993).
(18)The year-on-year CPI inflation increased from 8.0 per cent in
February 1992 to 9.5 per cent in June 1992, resuming a declin-
ing trend thereafter.
(19)On the ERM crisis and the reaction of the Portuguese authori-
ties see Banco de Portugal, Annual Report 1992 and 1993; Bento
and Gaspar (1993); and Bento (1995).26 Banco de Portugal /Economic bulletin /December 2001
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Chart 10
THE ERM EXPERIENCE: APRIL 1992 -DECEMBER 1998






































































































Source: Banco de Portugal.








































































































Source: Banco de Portugal.





































































































Source: Banco de Portugal.
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Source: Banco de Portugal.
Notes:(a) Interest rate differential between a Portuguese
bond denominated in DM and a German bond
for a similar maturity.
(b)Interest rate differential between Portuguese
bonds denominated in PTE and in DM, for the
same maturity.ceived as a regime shift, together with the emer-
gence of a negative output gap in 1993, are likely
to have contained the transmission of the ex-
change rate depreciation to domestic prices. The
increase in the unemployment rate in 1993-95 fos-
tered wage moderation, contributing to a sus-
tained deceleration of non-tradables prices.(20)
When the economy re-bounded as from the
mid-1990s, the successful preservation of exchange
rate stability since mid-1993 anchored inflation ex-
pectations, preventing a re-acceleration of prices.
Inflation declined from over 9 per cent in mid-1992
to about 2 per cent in end-1997.
The stability of the nominal exchange rate since
mid-1993 and the continuous decline of the infla-
tion rate since the early 1990s, allowed a sustained
and significant reduction of both short- and long-
term nominal interest rates. Average long-term in-
terest rates declined from a peak of 12.2 per cent in
April 1995 to 4.1 per cent in December 1998 (Chart
10E). During the same period the long-term inter-
est rate differential against the D-mark narrowed
from over 5 p.p. to about 0.3 p.p. At a certain point
in time, a virtuous circle between nominal conver-
gence and the prospect of EMU participation
started to emerge. Progress towards nominal con-
vergence increased the likelihood of Portugal
meeting the convergence criteria for EMU partici-
pation, whereas, at the same time, increased pros-
pects of EMU participation facilitated exchange
rate stability, the convergence of interest rates to
the lowest levels in the EU and the improvement
of the budget balance.(21) This virtuous circle is re-
flected in the substantial decline of the foreign ex-
change risk premium as from mid-1995 (Chart
10F).
4. ASSESSING THE COSTS OF DISINFLATION
There is now a widespread recognition that in-
flation and uncertainty about future inflation neg-
atively affect the level of welfare in the econ-
omy.(22) However, while the medium to long-run
benefits of a disinflation programme are beyond
question, a disinflation process is often associated
with a temporary increase in unemployment and a
loss of output, reflecting the short-term trade-off
between inflation and employment (and out-
put).(23) As a result of hysteresis, short-run costs
may persist over the medium term, particularly in
the labour market. Such costs may affect the will-
ingness of the policy authorities to pursue a con-
sistent disinflation strategy.
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(20)This is not to say that the nominal depreciation of the escudo
had no impact on the exchange rate. Initially the impact of the
depreciation on prices was probably masked by favourable
base effects related to the unwinding of the impact on the infla-
tion rate of the VAT increase in the first quarter of 1992. How-
ever, as from mid-1993 a temporary acceleration of tradable
goods prices is clearly evident (the year-on-year rate of change
of tradable goods prices increased from 3.4 per cent in June
1993 to 5.3 per cent one year later). The decline of average CPI
inflation from 6.5 per cent in 1993 to 5.2 per cent in 1994 can ba-
sically be attributed to the deceleration of non-tradable goods
prices from 9.0 to 6.3 per cent. Tradables inflation remained
virtually unchanged over this period (4.6 per cent in 1993 and
4.4 per cent in 1994).
(21)As noted in section 2.1 above, after significant improvements in
the second half of the 1980s, the process of budgetary consoli-
dation suffered a serious reversal in the early 1990s. The set-
back in fiscal consolidation reflected an expansionary fiscal
policy in 1990-91, the sharp downturn of the economy in 1993
and severe tax collection problems following the elimination of
border controls within the European Union in January 1993. A
steady improvement of the budget balance was achieved from
1994 onwards. The deficit to GDP ratio was continuously
brought down from over 6.0 per cent of GDP in 1993, to 2.1 per
cent of GDP in 1998. After peaking at 65.9 per cent of GDP in
1995, the debt ratio declined to 60.0 per cent of GDP in 1998. In
1997 Portugal was no longer in an excessive deficit situation.
The Council decision on the existence of an excessive deficit in
Portugal was abrogated in May 1998, ensuring compliance
with the EMU criterion on the sustainability of public finances.
It should be noted, however, that the improvement of the defi-
cit ratio was achieved as a result of the decline of the interest
burden. In fact, over the period 1995-1998, both the primary
balance and the cyclically-adjusted primary balance as a per
cent of GDP have deteriorated.
(22)Costs from inflation identified in the theoretical literature arise
from the need to frequently revise price lists, the need to ec-
onomise on real money balances, the less than full indexation
of tax systems and debt contracts, the unplanned redistribution
of income and wealth, increased uncertainty about future
prices, and the difficulty in identifying relative price changes.
The theoretical literature finds empirical support in a vast
number of applied work, where a negative relation between in-
flation and economic performance is established. The evidence
regarding the costs of inflation has led to the adoption of price
stability as the main objective of monetary policy in a large
number of countries. See Briault (1995), Barbosa et al. (1999)
and ECB (2001).
(23)This trade-off results from rigidities in product and labour
markets, as well as in debt contracts. Unless economic agents
perfectly anticipate the decline in inflation, and have the possi-
bility of adjusting their contracts accordingly, disinflation will
lead to a loss of output and employment.Against this background, an important ques-
tion is to assess whether there have been any sig-
nificant (short-run) costs of disinflation in Portu-
gal. This is the aim of the present section. Disinfla-
tion costs are likely to depend on the structural
characteristics of the economy and on the features
of the disinflation programme. Given that the Por-
tuguese disinflation strategy was based on a non-
accommodating exchange rate policy, one would
expect potential costs to be apparent in a deterio-
rating performance of the external sector, which in
turn would be likely to translate into increasing
unemployment and a decline of output. This sug-
gests that one should start by looking at how the
external sector has performed during the disinfla-
tion period. A second step would then be to look
more closely at output and labour market devel-
opments.
4.1. The external sector
Conventional measures of the real effective ex-
change rate show a significant real appreciation of
the escudo since 1987, when the exchange rate pol-
icy turned less accommodating (Chart 11). The
magnitude of the appreciation varies considerably
according to the actual measure used. The accu-
mulated rate of appreciation in the period
1987-1992 ranges from 35 per cent, when mea-
sured on the basis of relative unit labour costs in
the whole economy, and 20 per cent when mea-
sured on the basis of unit labour costs in manufac-
turing. Real appreciation was particularly strong
in the period 1990-92, after the crawling-peg was
abandoned. Following a period of instability in the
context of the ERM crisis in 1992-93, the real effec-
tive exchange rate has remained quite stable from
1995 to 1998, at a level close to that prevailing
from mid-1992 to early 1993. The ratio of prices of
non-tradable to tradable goods also shows a sub-
stantial appreciation, particularly as from 1989.
The performance of the external sector does not
point to any significant erosion of the competitive-
ness of the Portuguese economy during the disin-
flation period. As can be observed from Chart 12,
real export growth was high, market share gains
were significant, movements in the trade balance
and the current account do not point to an ex-
change rate misalignment, and no unsustainable
compression of exporters’ profit margins appears
to have taken place.
A very strong growth of both imports and ex-
ports took place following EC accession, leading to
significant increases of both import penetration
and export market shares (Charts 12A and 12B).
Real import growth clearly outpaced the expan-
sion of exports, leading to an increase of the trade
deficit in the period 1986-1988, in spite of signifi-
cant terms of trade gains (Charts 12C and 12D).
This deterioration of the trade balance occurred
before real appreciation had become significant,
and at a time when domestic demand growth in
Portugal was significantly higher than abroad
(Chart 12E).(24) Moreover, in 1988, exporters’ unit
profit margins were still considerably above their
level in 1985 (Char 12F). The increased trade defi-
cit thus appears to reflect the behaviour of relative
domestic demand growth, rather than a loss of
competitiveness of Portuguese exporters. The wid-
ening trade deficit was partly compensated by the
increase of unilateral public transfers (particularly
related to the inflow of Community structural
funds), and the current account was kept broadly
balanced. From 1989 onwards both the trade and
the current account balance as a percentage of
28 Banco de Portugal /Economic bulletin /December 2001
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Chart 11






















































































Sources: Banco de Portugal; IMF; OECD; INE; Ministério do
Trabalho e da Solidariedade.
(24)The liberalisation of automobile imports, which gave rise to a
stock adjustment, has also contributed to the large deteriora-
tion of the trade balance observed in 1988.Banco de Portugal /Economic bulletin /December 2001 29
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Chart 12
THE EXTERNAL SECTOR DURING THE DISINFLATION PERIOD




























































































































Source: Banco de Portugal.














































































































Source: Banco de Portugal.




















































































Source: Banco de Portugal.






















































































Source: Banco de Portugal.

























































































Relative domestic demand (Portugal-EU15)
Change in trade deficit as a % of GDP
Source: OECD and Banco de Portugal.
















































































Source: Banco de Portugal.GDP remained broadly stable, again moving in a
manner consistent with changes in relative domes-
tic demand. The substantial increase of exporters’
profits in 1985-87 was only partially reversed in
1988-92, when the bulk of real appreciation has
taken place. By the end of the disinflation process,
in 1997-98, unit profit margins in the exports’ sec-
tor were about 6 per cent above their level in 1985.
The favourable performance of the external sec-
tor suggests that an equilibrium real appreciation
was taking place at the time when disinflation was
being pursued.(25) Estimates of the so-called “fun-
damental equilibrium real exchange rate” (FEER)
give support to this possibility.(26) Chart 13, which
depicts the observed (CPI-based) real effective ex-
change rate together with an (estimated) path for
the FEER, suggests that the Portuguese economy
was “over-competitive” from the mid-1980s to the
early 1990s, and that the observed real exchange
rate did not deviate significantly from its esti-
mated equilibrium values from 1992 to 1995.
Substantial capital inflows related to the Com-
munity structural funds and to the process of fi-
nancial integration (Charts 14 and 15) induced a
relaxation of the intertemporal external constraint
of the Portuguese economy.(27)(28) Through their
impact on investment, these capital inflows fos-
tered the convergence of Portuguese per capita in-
30 Banco de Portugal /Economic bulletin /December 2001
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Chart 13

































































Source: Costa (1998), OECD, INE and Banco de Portugal.
(25)On the equilibrium real appreciation of the Portuguese escudo
see Manteu and Neves (1998), Gaspar and Pereira (1995),
Gaspar and Leite (1995), Gaspar and Pinheiro (1994), Cunha
and Machado (1993), Gaspar (1990), Rebelo (1992).
(26)See Costa (1998). The results in this paper are consistent with






































































































































































Source: Banco de Portugal.
Chart 14
PORTUGAL – NET PUBLIC TRANSFERS
(27)In other words, a given level of the fundamental balance
(which basically corresponds to the balance of current transac-
tions and “permanent” capital flows – i.e., foreign direct invest-
ment flows) could be achieved at a more appreciated exchange
rate.
(28)A significant terms of trade improvement, reflecting the com-
bined effect of a US dollar depreciation and a marked decline
in oil prices, also contributed to a slowdown of the external
constraint of the Portuguese economy, particularly in the pe-
riod 1985-87.come to EU levels (the so-called “real conver-
gence”, or “catching-up” process).(29) A process of
catching-up with more developed economies
tends to be associated with an equilibrium real ex-
change rate appreciation.(30)
The behaviour of labour productivity in Portu-
gal suggests that some of the observed real ex-
change rate appreciation was indeed caused by fa-
vourable productivity shocks in the tradable
goods sector(31) (Chart 16). The transition to the
steady-state capital/labour ratio also appears to
have played a role in explaining the appreciation
of the real exchange rate.(32)
Besides their medium-to-long run supply-side
effects, structural funds and financial integration
were also associated with an immediate expan-
sionary impact on aggregate demand. In addition
to a strong impact on investment expenditure,
there was pressure on public expenditure (reflect-
ing the principles of additionality and comple-
mentarity applying to the structural funds), and
private consumption (reflecting the perception of
an increase in permanent income). Strong demand
growth in the early 1990s reinforced the pressure
towards real appreciation of the escudo, generat-
ing a dilemma between nominal appreciation of
the exchange rate and higher inflation.(33) Given
that disinflation was an explicit policy objective,
the only option from a monetary policy viewpoint
would have been to allow a stronger nominal ap-
preciation of the currency.(34) However, this option
would have concentrated the burden of the adjust-
ment on the tradables sector. The risk of over-
shooting could not be ignored, and there was no
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Chart 16
RELATIVE PRICES AND PRODUCTIVITIES
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Source: Costa (2000).
(29)Structural funds are aimed at reducing the relative scarcity of
capital in the EC poorest regions. By fostering (public, private
and human) capital accumulation, the funds contribute to en-
hance the supply potential in the recipient countries in the me-
dium to long run, thus promoting real convergence. Financial
integration contributes to reinforce the process of real conver-
gence through its favourable impact on the efficiency of finan-
cial intermediation. Integration in the Community – by
improving economic prospects and signalling the commitment
to an “investment-friendly” economic and political regime
greatly enhanced Portugal’s attractiveness for investment. This
translated into a (permanent) decline of the country’s risk pre-
mium, allowing Portugal to benefit from massive foreign di-
rect investment flows in the late 1980s and early 1990s. See
Gaspar and Pereira (1995) and Gaspar and Leite (1995).
(30)It is an empirical observation that countries’ price levels tend to
be positively related to the level of real per capita income (see
Esteves (1993) for an application to Portugal), and that such
price level discrepancies result from a lower level of
non-tradable goods prices in poorer countries. This means that
countries in a catching-up process thus tend to have higher in-
flation rates than abroad. Explanations for this empirical regu-
larity include cross-country productivity differences (the
so-called Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis), cross-country differ-
ences in factor endowments (the so-called Bhagwati-Kravis-
Lipsey view), and the idea that the income elasticity of
non-tradable goods is greater than one. See Balassa (1964),
Samuelson (1964), Bhagwatti (1984), Kravis and Lipsey (1983
and 1987) and Bergstrand (1991).
(31)Costa (2000) studies the behaviour of relative prices and
productivities in the tradable and non tradable sectors in Por-
tugal and in Germany. The analysis suggests that Portugal has
experienced a Balassa-Samuelson effect in 1986-1995. In this pe-
riod, the increase of the relative price of non-tradable goods
was higher in Portugal than in Germany (i.e., PN/PT (Port) >
PN/PT (Germany)). This coincided with a higher growth rate
of the relative labour productivity in the tradable goods sector
(i.e., (prod T/ Prod N(Port)) >(Prod T/Prod N (Germany)),
which was determined by the faster increase of labour produc-
tivity in the tradables sector in Portugal.
(32)See Brito and Correia (2000).
(33)It has been argued that the pressure towards real appreciation
in the early 1990s was the result of an overly tight monetary
policy, which was stimulating massive capital inflows. See
Cunha and Machado (1993) and Lopes (1994). However, while
(significantly) lower interest rates would have curbed (short-
term) capital inflows, easing the pressure towards nominal ap-
preciation of the currency, they would also have exacerbated
the excessive growth of domestic demand. This would most
likely translate into higher domestic inflation and an even
stronger real appreciation of the currency.
(34)Higher interest rate increases, coupled with a policy of nominal
stability of the escudo, would have stimulated further (short-
term) capital inflows at a time when domestic liquidity man-
agement was already rather complicated.consensus among the policy authorities for letting
the currency appreciate. In this context, fiscal re-
straint would have been the obvious policy solu-
tion to moderate the pressure towards real appre-
ciation. Instead, as already noted, fiscal policy was
clearly expansionary in the period 1990-91. This
translated into a fundamentally unbalanced pol-
icy-mix, which may have caused some overshoot-
ing of the real exchange rate relative to equilib-
rium levels.(35)
4.2. Output and labour market developments
The absence of clear evidence pointing towards
an erosion of the competitiveness of Portuguese
exporters in the context of substantial real appreci-
ation of the escudo suggests that costs from the
disinflation process were, at most, rather low. This
view is confirmed by looking at output and labour
market developments over the disinflation period.
Following a sustained expansion after EC ac-
cession, the Portuguese economy experienced a
sharp deceleration from 1991 onwards, and en-
tered into recession in 1993. The unemployment
rate increased from 4.0 in 1992 to over 7.0 per cent
in 1995/96. It could be argued that the 1993 reces-
sion and the subsequent increase in the unemploy-
ment rate were the result of the disinflation policy
that was being followed or, in other words, that
they were reflecting the costs of disinflation in
terms of economic activity and employment. How-
ever, in order to assess the costs of disinflation one
needs a benchmark. One possibility is to look at
output and labour market developments in Portu-
gal both over a long horizon(36), and in comparison
to developments in other EU countries.
Developments in real economic activity suggest
that the 1993 recession was less strong than previ-
ous ones. Indeed, the 1975 and the 1983-84 reces-
sions were associated with a more marked decline
of GDP and a more negative growth differential
against the EU (Chart 17). In fact, the EU also suf-
fered a recession in 1993, and the deceleration of
economic activity in Portugal can largely be ex-
plained by the decline in real foreign demand ob-
served in that year. The idea that the 1993 reces-
sion was not particularly severe is consistent with
the behaviour of the Portuguese output gap (Chart
18).(37) During the disinflation period, the unem-
ployment rate in Portugal stayed consistently (and
significantly) below the EU average (Chart 19).
Portuguese labour market developments appear to
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Source: European Commission.
(35)This view is in line with Gaspar and Pinheiro (1994), who claim
that positive demand shocks (related to the behaviour of exter-
nal demand, massive capital inflows and, in particular, from an
expansionary fiscal policy) were an important factor in explain-
ing the magnitude of the real appreciation of the exchange rate
in the period 1990-1992. Along the same lines, Barbosa (1996)
argued that the re-acceleration of inflation in 1988-1990 was es-
sentially caused by demand shocks. See also Borges (1994).
(36)An alternative (and rather common) way of assessing disinfla-
tion costs consists in estimating the so-called “sacrifice ratio”,
which measures the average decline (increase) of output (un-
employment) in relation to potential output (natural rate of un-
employment) per each percentage point decline of the inflation
rate. This approach is followed in Barbosa and Machado (1996),
who compute sacrifice ratios for a number of EU countries that
have undergone disinflation experiences in the 1980s and 1990s
(i.e., Portugal, Ireland, France, Spain and Italy). For Portugal, a
sacrifice ratio of 0.7 is obtained when the periods 1984-88 and
1991-94 (i.e. when a decline of inflation was observed) are
taken together. As underlined by the authors themselves, re-
sults are rather sensitive to the choice of the period for which
the sacrifice ratio is computed. Indeed, if one extended the
computations up to 1997 (the end of the disinflation process)
the sacrifice ratio obtained would be lower, given develop-
ments in the output gap in 1994-97. In any case, it is worth
mentioning that the results obtained for Portugal compare fa-
vourably with those obtained for the remaining countries. This
again is consistent with the idea that costs from disinflation
have not been significant in Portugal.
(37)The results obtained by Botas, Marques and Neves (1998) also
indicate that the output gap estimated for the period following
the 1993 recession is clearly less negative than that obtained
following the 1975 and 1983/84 recessions.have reflected business cycle conditions, with no
evidence of an increase in the natural rate of un-
employment(38). Real wage flexibility has acted as
a partial substitute for employment/unemploy-
ment movements, providing a smoothing mecha-
nism for economic activity (Chart 20). Three main
conclusions emerge from this picture. First, labour
market developments in Portugal compare favour-
ably with those in the EU in the disinflation pe-
riod. Secondly, the process of disinflation, and the
related monetary and exchange rate regime shift,
do not appear to have affected the structural fea-
tures of the Portuguese labour market. Finally, the
responsiveness of real wages to changes in unem-
ployment is likely to have contributed to the low
costs of the disinflation strategy in Portugal.
5. CONCLUSION
In 1985, real per capita income in Portugal was
about half that in the European Community, the
economy suffered from significant macroeconomic
disequilibria, and the weight of the public sector in
productive activities was substantial. Accession to
the Community has brought about many difficult
challenges, as well as key opportunities. The pro-
cess of trade and financial integration, and later on
the commitment to being a founding member of
monetary union, provided the “stick and carrot”
for the country to adopt an economic regime based
on the prevalence of market mechanisms and mac-
roeconomic stability. Such a regime is a necessary
condition for the sustained convergence of real per
capita income towards Community levels.
There are important lessons to be learnt from
successes and mistakes in the process of stabilisa-
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Source: European Commission.
(38)A number of studies suggest that, at least for the past 15 years,
the Portuguese natural rate of unemployment has been mov-
ing without trend around a range of 5.5 to 6.0 per cent (see
footnote 5 above) and that the behaviour of the Portuguese la-
bour market can be characterised by a stable Okun relation
(estimates of an Okun equation indicate that a 1 percentage
point deviation of output growth from trend leads to a decline
of the unemployment rate by about 0.5 percentage points after
one year). This evidence suggests that unemployment has
been essentially determined by developments in economic ac-
tivity. On the macroeconomic features of the Portuguese la-
bour market see Barbosa (1999), Botas and Marques (1997),
Gaspar and Luz (1997) and Luz and Pinheiro (1994).tion in Portugal. Given the similarities in the point
of departure, these lessons can be most useful to
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe cur-
rently preparing for accession.
First and foremost, real and nominal conver-
gence should be seen as mutually reinforcing.
While this idea is generally accepted in a medium-
to long-run perspective, the existence of a (short-
run) trade-off between real growth and nominal
stabilisation often receives disproportionate atten-
tion in the policy debate. The Portuguese disinfla-
tion experience shows that, provided the right
conditions are in place, this short-run trade-off
does not necessarily emerge. An equilibrium real
appreciation of the escudo in the period following
accession to the Community, the pursuit of
broadly appropriate macroeconomic policies, and
the macroeconomic flexibility of the Portuguese la-
bour market have made it possible to disinflate
“without pain”.
Secondly, trade liberalisation and financial inte-
gration lead to a radical change of the environ-
ment in which the authorities define and imple-
ment their economic policies. Integration increases
the costs of economic distortions and inconsistent
policies, clearly illustrated by the failure of the
Portuguese authorities to simultaneously pursue a
tight domestic monetary policy and contain the
appreciation of the escudo, in a context of capital
movement liberalisation; however, integration also
enhances the rewards from sound policies, as ap-
parent from the emergence of a virtuous circle be-
tween nominal convergence and the prospect of
EMU participation.
Finally, a balanced monetary and fiscal pol-
icy-mix can greatly reduce the risks of an excessive
real appreciation of the currency in the context of
disinflation. The monetary and exchange rate pol-
icy pursued since accession to the Community was
key to the success of the disinflation process. In
1990-1992, when the crawling-peg regime was
abandoned and real appreciation steepened, this
policy was subject to a lot of criticism. It was often
argued that an overly tight policy was inducing an
excessive real appreciation of the currency which
in turn was hurting the real side of the economy.
However, real appreciation was an endogenous
response to the process of real convergence and to
excess demand in the economy. The pressure to-
wards real appreciation of the escudo could have
been attenuated through a programme of fiscal re-
straint aimed at moderating the expansionary im-
pact on domestic demand from financial integra-
tion and the Community structural funds. How-
ever, fiscal policy was rather expansionary in
1990-91, and the resulting unbalanced policy-mix
may have caused some overshooting of the ex-
change rate relative to equilibrium levels.
The policy lessons drawn here from the Portu-
guese disinflation experience cannot be extrapo-
lated to the current situation in which the country
has become a member of EMU. Participation in a
monetary union raises new challenges, which are
not necessarily less demanding than the ones
faced during the disinflation process. While the
price stability regime which characterises EMU
provides the best possible framework for sustain-
able growth and employment creation, steady real
convergence will depend crucially on the pursuit
of sound domestic policies. Preserving the flexibil-
ity of real wages and strictly adhering to the re-
quirements of the Stability and Growth Pact, a
necessary condition for fiscal policy to play its sta-
bilisation role, are obviously relevant in this con-
text.
REFERENCES
Balassa, B. (1964), “The Purchasing Power Doc-
trine: A reappraisal”, Journal of Political econ-
omy, no. 72.
Banco de Portugal, “Report of the Board of Directors
and Economic and Financial Survey”, various is-
sues.
Banco de Portugal, “Economic Bulletin”, various is-
sues.
Barbosa et al. (1999), “O Impacto do Euro na Eco-
nomia Portuguesa”, Publicações Dom Qui-
xote, January 1999.
Barbosa, A.P. and J.A.Ferreira Machado (1996),
“The cost of Portuguese disinflation: a note”,
Banco de Portugal, Economic Bulletin, Vol. 2,
no.3, September 1996.
Barbosa, A.P. (1996), “The origins of Portuguese in-
flation:1977-1994", Banco de Portugal, Eco-
nomic Bulletin, Vol.2 no.1, March 1996.
Barosa, J. and Cunha, L.C. (1990), “A inflação em
Portugal: Uma abordagem não estrutural”,
Working Paper no. 154 Universidade Nova de
Lisboa - Faculdade de Economia, June 1990.
34 Banco de Portugal /Economic bulletin /December 2001
ArticlesBarosa, J. e Cunha, L.C. (1989), “Short-run Dynam-
ics of Inflation: the Portuguese case”, in Nova
Economia em Portugal, Estudos em Homenagem a
António Manuel Pinto Barbosa, FEUNL.
Bento, V. (1995), “The management of exchange
rate pressures - The Portuguese experience
with capital controls”, Banco de Portugal, Eco-
nomic Bulletin, Vol.1, no. 3, September 1995.
Bento, V. and Gaspar, V. (1993), “A Portuguese
Perspective”, in Paul Temperton (ed), The Eu-
ropean Currency Crisis – What chance now
for a single European currency?, Probus Pub-
lishing Company, 1993.
Bergstrand, J.H. (1991), “Structural Determinants of
Real Exchange Rates and National Price
Levels: Some Empirical Evidence”, The Ameri-
can Economic Review, March 1991.
Bhagwatti, J. (1984), “Why are the services cheaper
in the poor countries?”, the Economic Journal,
1994.
Borges, A. (1994),”Opções estratégicas” Cadernos de
Economia, ano VII, no. 26, Jan./Mar.1994.
Borges, A. (1991a), “A Economia Portuguesa de
1985 a 1991 – Estabilização, Crescimento,
Reformas Estruturais e Equidade”, in Portugal
em Mudança - Ensaios sobre a actividade do
XI Governo Constitucional, Imprensa Nacio-
nal - Casa da Moeda.
Borges, A. (1991b), “Portuguese Banking in the Sin-
gle European Market”, in Dermine, J.(ed), Eu-
ropean Banking in the 1990’s, Basil Blackwell.
Borges, A. (1987), “Economia Portuguesa – Situa-
ção e Perspectivas”, in Informação IPE,
no.17/18, Sep./Dec. 1987.
Botas, S., Marques, C.R. and Neves, P.D. (1998),
“Estimation of potential output for the Portu-
guese economy”, Banco de Portugal, Economic
Bulletin, Vol.4 no. 4, December 1998.
Botas, S. and C.R.Marques (1997), “Estimation of
the NAIRU for the Portuguese economy”,
Banco de Portugal WP 6/97.
Briault, C. (1995), “The Costs of Inflation”, Bank of
England Quarterly Bulletin, Vol.35, no .1, Feb-
ruary 1995.
Brito, P. and I.H.Correia (2000), “Inflation Differen-
tial and Real Convergence in Portugal”, Eco-
nomic Bulletin, Banco de Portugal, June 2000.
Centeno, M. (1994), “Política orçamental: indicadores e
análise”, Quarterly Bulletin, Banco de Portugal,
de March 1994.
Costa, S. (2000), “Inflation differential between Por-
tugal and Germany”, Economic Bulletin, Banco
de Portugal, June 2000.
Costa, S. (1998), “Determination of the equilibrium
real exchange rate for the Portuguese econ-
omy using the FEER”, Economic Bulletin,
Banco de Portugal, Vol.4, no.2, June 1998.
Cunha, J.C. and Neves, P.D. (1995), “Fiscal Policy
in Portugal: 1986-94", In Economic Bulletin,
Banco de Portugal, March 1995.
Cunha, L.C. and Machado, J.F. (1993), “A PPP
model of Real Appreciation”, Working Paper
no. 210, Universidade Nova de Lisboa –
Faculdade de Economia, December 1993.
Cunha. L.C. and Machado, J.F. (1992), “Competi-
tividade e política cambial: uma análise
empírica”, Economia, vol. XVI, no. 3, October
1992.
Esteves, P.S. (1996), “Convergence across EU coun-
tries: Inflation and savings rates on physical
and human capital”, Banco de Portugal
WP-1/96.
Esteves, P.S. (1995), “Real convergence in the Euro-
pean Union: Human capital and inflation”,
Economic Bulletin, Banco de Portugal, Vol.1,
no.1, March 1995.
Esteves, P.S. (1993), “Crescimento Económico e
Taxa de Câmbio Real – A experiência
portuguesa (1948-1992)”, Banco de Portugal
Quarterly Bulletin, December 1993.
European Central Bank (2001), “Why Price Stabil-
ity?”, Proceedings of the first ECB Central
Banking Conference, forthcoming.
European Commission (2000), European Economy,
no. 70, Statistical Annex, Directorate-General
for Economic Affairs, 2000.
European Commission (1997), “The Economic and
Financial Situation in Portugal in the Transi-
tion to EMU”, DG II, Doc.II/677/96-EN-( Final),
April 1997.
Gaspar, V. and S.Luz (1997), “Unemployment and
wages in Portugal”, Banco de Portugal, Eco-
nomic Bulletin, Vol.3, no.4 December 1997.
Gaspar, V. and A.N.Leite (1995), “Cohesion and
convergence – Economic effects of structural
funds”, Banco de Portugal, Economic Bulletin,
September 1995.
Gaspar, V. and A.M.Pereira (1995), “The impact of
financial integration and unilateral public
transfers on investment and growth in
Banco de Portugal /Economic bulletin /December 2001 35
ArticlesEC-capital importing countries”, Journal of De-
velopment Economics, Vol. 48 (1995) 43-66.
Gaspar, V. and M. Pinheiro (1994), “Desinflação e
Competitividade”, Quarterly Bulletin, Banco de
Portugal, Vol.16, no.2, June 1994.
Gaspar, V. (1990), “Discussion of chapters 5 and 6“,
in C.Bliss and J.B.Macedo (eds), ”Unity with
Diversity in the European Economy: the Com-
munity’s Southern Frontier”, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
International Monetary Fund (1997), World Eco-
nomic Outlook, May 1997.
International Monetary Fund (1993), International
Capital Markets – Part I: Exchange Rate Man-
agement and International Capital Flows,
IMF, April 1993.
Kravis, I. and Lipsey, R. (1987), “The assessment of
national price levels”, in S.Arndt and D.Richard-
son (eds), Real-Financial Linkages among
Open Economies, MIT Press, Cambridge.
Kravis, I. and Lipsey, R. (1983), “Toward an expla-
nation of national price levels”, Princeton stud-
ies in International Finance, 52.
Lopes (1994), “A experência de economia
Portuguesa no período 1990/93”, Cadernos de
Economia, ano VII, no. 26, Jan./Mar. 1994.
Luz, S. and M.Pinheiro (1994), “Wage rigidity and
job mismatch in Europe: some evidence”,
Banco de Portugal, WP-2/94.
Manteu, C. and P.D.Neves (1998), “Portugal 1986
to 1996: An Example of an Equilibrium Real
Appreciation”, in “Current Account Imbal-
ances in East and West: Do They Matter?”,
Oesterreichische Nationalbank, Vienna 1998.
Manteu, C. and Mello, A.S. (1992), “Taxa de
Câmbio de Equilíbrio Fundamental”, Quar-
terly Bulletin, Banco de Portugal, December
1992.
Marques, C.R. (1995), “Exchange Rate Movements,
Inflation and Wages”, Economic Bulletin, Banco
de Portugal, June 1995.
Marques, C.R. (1990), “Inflação em Portugal – Um
estudo econométrico para o período
1965-1989", Banco de Portugal, WP-2/90.
Marques, C.R. (1990), “Produto potencial,
desemprego e inflação em Portugal – Um
estudo para o período 1974-1989", Banco de
Portugal, WP-1/90.
OECD (1999), Economic Surveys – Portugal 1999.
Rebelo, S. (1992), “Inflation in fixed exchange rate
regimes: the recent Portuguese experience”,
Banco de Portugal WP-11/92.
Samuelson, P.(1964), “Theoretical notes on trade
problems”, Review of Economics and statistics,
46.
Silva, A.C. (1994), “Combinação de políticas de
estabilização num quadro de integração: A
experiência portuguesa”, Brotéria, no.138.
36 Banco de Portugal /Economic bulletin /December 2001
Articles